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Abstract 
The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) experienced significant developments during the 
Tampere programme (1999 – 2004). This article analyses how security is constituted or viewed by 
the European Union in the area of asylum policy; more importantly how the European Commission, 
in the face of the emerging discourse on the ‘war on terror’ decided to push for a more inclusive 
agenda. Thus, the European Commission can (though not always does) play a significant role in this 
process - the role of a supranational policy entrepreneur that enables the normative construction of 
a policy. The article analyses the high-profile case of the first phase of the CEAS, particularly the four 
main directives, its legal and political construction, and suggests the significance of the 
Commission in the political and normative process. Despite the challenges of the ‘war on terror’, the 
Commission managed to keep the CEAS within the limits of the Geneva Convention.  
Keywords 
Common European Asylum System; European Commission; European Integration;  
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IN RECENT YEARS, MIGRATION AND ASYLUM ISSUES HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY 
contentious in Western Europe – at the core of electoral campaigns in several European 
Union (EU) member states: France, the Netherlands, Denmark and the UK. This article 
analyses how security is constituted or viewed by the EU in the area of asylum policy; more 
importantly how the European Commission, in the face of the emerging discourse on the 
‘war on terror’, decided to push for a more inclusive agenda.  
 
Since the events of the 11 September 2001 (9/11), it has been argued by some scholars 
that security has become the dominant force in the first phase of the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS). As a result, there has been an active debate on the ‘securitization’ 
of the EU asylum and migration policy (Bigo 1996, 1998a, 1998b, 19998c, 1998d, 2001, 
2002; Guild 1999, 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2004, 2006; Guiraudon 2000, 2003; Huysmans 
2000, 2004). In this context, ‘securitization’ refers to the theoretical suggestion that asylum 
and migration are presented as security threats, based on the framework by the so-called 
‘Copenhagen School’ (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1993, 1995). Levy (2005: 35) 
suggests that 9/11 represents a turning point because ‘the trend towards liberalisation 
seemed to be stopped dead in its tracks by the events of 9/11’. Boswell (2007) concurs that 
while EU migration policies were not securitised since 9/11, this does not hold for asylum 
policies. Some non-governmental organisations (Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International, and Statewatch) have also expressed their fear that security concerns could 
affect the European Union’s effort to create a Common European Asylum System.  
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However, this fear should be counter-intuitive. The European Union is well known for its 
legalistic approach to policy problems, which aims to appear to always follow the letter of 
the law; in fact, the Commission is often derided for being technocratic. It seems thus 
counter-intuitive that the EU would ‘securitize’ the EU Asylum Policy. According to the 
Copenhagen School (who argue that an issue is transformed into a security issue, in other 
words – securitized, after a securitizing actor presents it as an existential threat and this 
‘securitizing move’ is accepted by the audience), this would mean that EU institutions 
deliberately construct refugees as a security threat in order to be able to use ‘emergency 
measures’ (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1993, 1995). Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 
(1998: 25) note that ‘the existential threat has to be argued and just gain enough 
resonance for a platform to be made from which it is possible to legitimize emergency 
measures or other steps that would not have been possible (…)’. This means that the same 
EU institutions that want to give the impression of following the letter of the law want to 
construct a situation in which the letter of the law can be disregarded (‘emergency 
measures’). The way in which the EU institutions would aim to achieve this would be 
through a discursive construction of threats, thereby lifting the issues ‘outside the normal 
realms of politics’ (Buzan 1991; Buzan et al. 1998; Wæver 1993, 1995). On the face of it, this 
seems plausible for right-wing politicians at the national level, but rather unlikely for EU 
bureaucrats who loathe nothing more than the ‘political limelight’. 
 
Moreover, this goes against several academic arguments that were often made about 
asylum cooperation in Europe. Amongst academic scholars in the field of immigration and 
asylum, the argument has been advanced that EU governments decided to ‘venue shop’. 
This meant that they decided to circumvent domestic pressures and obstacles, and 
therefore ‘escaped’ to legislate at the EU level where they were protected from these 
issues (Boswell 2003a, 2003b, 2007, 2008; Ellermann 2008; Freeman 1998; Joppke 1998, 
2001; Geddes 2000, 2001; Guiraudon 2000, 2001, 2003; Lavenex 1998, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 
2004, 2006; Occhipinti 2003; Stetter 2000, 2007; Thielemann 2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2005, 
2006; Thielemann and Dewan 2006). EU member states, in this argument, have thus 
decided to enhance their co-operation in the field of asylum and migration in a process 
driven by national bureaucracies. These state-centred accounts (see especially, Joppke 
1998; Freeman 1998) stress the resilience of nation states, their ability to control ‘unwanted 
immigration’ and the use of the EU by its member states as a device for attaining 
immigration and asylum (see Thielemann 2001a, 2001b) policy objectives that are unlikely 
to be achieved at the domestic level alone. If indeed, national policy-makers are perfectly 
able to circumvent national pressures in order to restrict immigration and asylum at the EU 
level, why should they then ‘securitize’ the issues in order to achieve what they are already 
achieving? Why should national policy-makers go to a forum where technocracy is valued 
in order to securitize, which would be far easier in a national context? What are the 
constraints to securitize at the EU level, notably the Commission and its strong links to 
non-governmental organisation? Thus, this article will concentrate on the obstacles of 
securitization, i.e. the EU institutions, notably the European Commission, and the NGOs. 
 
This article therefore argues the following. Firstly, the Common European Asylum System, 
other than in its intrinsic value, is a very significant case for demonstrating that even with 
the ‘war on terror’ on the political agenda (see also Lodge 2004, 2007), the asylum policy in 
its first phase remained within the constraints of the Geneva Convention, and actually 
strengthened it. The balance between security and liberty, as a result, did not go as far 
towards security as some scholars may have feared, despite the importance of warning 
against such a possibility. Secondly, this article engages with the arguments made by 
intergovernmentalist EU scholars that the supranational institutions are “late, redundant, 
futile and even counterproductive” (Moravcsik 1999a: 270). This article argues that the 
Commission played a very active and significant role – the role of a supranational policy 
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entrepreneur – and in doing so managed to anchor the EU asylum policy in the prevailing 
norms of the international community, the Geneva Convention.  
 
The article will proceed in three stages. The first section will critically examine the main 
advances of the first phase of the CEAS during the Tampere programme. The second 
section will provide a brief outline of the debate on the political role of the European 
Commission as a supranational policy entrepreneur, and the precise framework used for 
this analysis. The third section will demonstrate the empirical findings within the case 
study of the four asylum directives. Finally, the article will suggest that the European 
Commission has been significant in the process of European integration in asylum policy 
by playing the normative role of supranational policy entrepreneurship, and managing to 
anchor the first phase of the EU Asylum Policy within the Geneva Convention. 
 
 
The Tampere programme in the EU Asylum Policy  
The EU asylum policy is embedded in a long-standing international regime of refugee 
protection (Loescher 1989, 1992, 1993, 1995, 2004; Marrus 1985, 1988; Noll 2000; Peers 
2002, 2004, 2006; Peers and Rogers 2006), which aims to keep the balance between 
security and liberty firmly towards liberty and the rights of victims of persecution. The 
international regime was established on 14 December 1949, when a Resolution of the 
United Nations General Assembly created the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The first instrument was created in 1951, when the 
Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted for Western Europe. 
Ever since, it has been the cornerstone of contemporary international refugee law, only 
supplemented by the 1967 New York Protocol, which extended the Geneva provisions to 
the rest of the world.  
 
Signatories to the convention, which include all EU member states, are required (according 
to Art. 1A (1) of the Geneva Convention) to offer refuge to a person who: 
 
 has a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,  
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; 
 is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or (due to such fear) is 
 unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; 
 or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former 
habitual residence, is unable or unwilling to return to it due to such fear 
 
Despite being the cornerstone of international refugee protection, not all member states 
interpret and apply the Geneva Convention in the same way. According to one NGO 
(interview NGO8), “some EU states’ interpretation of the law has no basis in the wording of 
the 1951 Geneva Convention, is not in the spirit of that convention and is in contradiction 
to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ official advice”. Differing definitions of 
‘refugee’ create different levels of protection and an uneven sharing of the responsibility. 
Most member states have a range of statuses to confer on refugees, with varying socio-
economic and judicial rights. This gap in interpretation provides clear opportunities for a 
progressive EU asylum policy 
 
 
What are the advances of the first phase of the EU asylum policy during Tampere?  
This section will analyse the legal advances of the first phase of the CEAS in more detail 
below. However, it is first necessary to underline the importance of the CEAS. According to 
Hailbronner (2004), the CEAS is important, even in the short term. The prospect of a CEAS 
has already produced harmonising effects in national legislations. With agreed common 
minimum standards, this will prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ between national legislators. 
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They are not competing with each other anymore for more restrictiveness, and thus do 
not need to lower their standards below their neighbours in order to reduce the numbers.  
 
Moreover, Ackers (2005: 33) makes a strong case for the importance of the CEAS in the 
longer term. The adoption of the four directives is of historical importance for the EU as it 
opens up the road to a new period in decision-making on the CEAS. The area becomes 
communitarised, which signifies transfer of national sovereignty to the EU level. 
Consequently, asylum policy is now in the EU order - very different from international law 
(Shaw 2000). Therefore, the Geneva Convention is now cemented in EU law, and the legal 
value is much stronger than it was before the Tampere programme. This is due to the 
distinction between international law and EU law - and the principle of national 
sovereignty compared to an EU pooling of sovereignty (Kaczorowska 2003; Shaw 2000).  
 
Thus, the legal doctrines of the direct effect of EU law and its supremacy will apply to the 
area for the first time. This creates enforceable legal obligations not only in vertical 
relations between public authority and individuals, but also in horizontal relations 
between individuals inter se (Weiler 1991, 1999). Community principles with direct effect 
can be invoked before domestic courts, which must provide adequate legal remedies. This 
is crucial as it alters the public international law assumption that legal obligations are 
addressed to states only, and thus do not create direct effects for nationals of that state. 
This has changed with the CEAS. These laws are now directly enforceable in domestic 
courts with little discretion. Individual asylum seekers can take states and individuals to the 
domestic courts. Thus, in addition to the EU supremacy of law, this provides a certain force 
to asylum rights which was previously missing under international law.  
 
One example is the frequent discussion on whether the UK may leave the Geneva 
Convention. In the last UK election campaign, the opposition leader Michael Howard (BBC 
22 April 2005) called for the UK’s withdrawal from the Geneva Convention on numerous 
occasions. This only reflected statements by David Blunkett, the then Home Secretary, in 
2003 (BBC News 2003). While the withdrawal from the Geneva Convention would be 
possible under international law prior to the CEAS, this is not possible anymore under the 
current rules. As the UK opted into all of the EU asylum rules, these are now fully binding 
and enforceable in UK courts. This hypothetical scenario makes it much clearer how the 
legal value of the Geneva Convention refugee protection has increased with the CEAS.  
 
Moreover, the communitarisation of asylum matters also implies that decision-making 
procedures have now changed. Future legislation in the area will include the co-decision 
procedure between the Council and the European Parliament, which was previously only 
consulted on the matter. In the Council, the voting procedure is now qualified majority 
voting (Peers 8 November 2004). This then removes any blocking possibilities by any of the 
27 member states. Therefore, on the institutional level, the CEAS represents a clear step 
forward and represents the hope that, with more and more involvement of other ‘refugee-
friendly’ EU institutions, such as the European Parliament, the future of the CEAS is 
progressive. 
 
However, as the analysis below will demonstrate, the current legislation already provides 
for a certain degree of progressive elements. The emphasis in the analysis below is only on 
the adopted legislative instruments - the four directives. The directives discussed below 
are: (1) the ‘reception conditions directive’, (2) the ‘asylum qualification directive’, and (3) 
the ‘asylum procedures directive’. The ‘temporary protection directive’ is not discussed 
below due to space restrictions, even though its value and interconnectedness to the first 
phase is obvious. The temporary protection directive (Council Directive 2001/55/EC), was 
the first legal instrument in asylum law in the legislative programme since Tampere. As it is 
intended as an effective instrument of temporary protection in the context of mass 
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refugee movements for people not falling under the remit of the Geneva Convention, it is 
not discussed in this article, despite its obvious links. 
 
 
(a) The ‘Reception Conditions Directive’ 
The reception conditions directive (Council Directive 2003/9/EC) of 27 January 2003 lays 
down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers across member states. 
Monar (2004: 118) describes this directive as an important new legal element of the 
common asylum system. It is the first element of three closely linked legislative initiatives: 
the asylum qualification directive, the reception conditions directive, and the asylum 
procedures directive.  
 
Hailbronner (2004: 78) explains the reasons why the reception conditions directive is such 
an important one. Firstly, the substantial differences in reception conditions in the various 
EU member states can be a factor for migratory movement of refugees within the EU. 
Logically, based on the Dublin convention and now the Dublin regulation, asylum seekers 
can only apply for asylum once in the EU, and thus the conditions in which they are being 
received matter significantly in their choice. In 2001, the Commission initiated this 
legislation, which was subsequently passed by the Council in January 2003. It defines 
certain key terms of the Geneva Convention, such as applicants for asylum, family 
members, unaccompanied minors, reception conditions, and detention.  
 
The directive only applies to applicants for asylum, which has been criticised (Guild 2004: 
213), especially as it does not apply to the temporary protection directive. The question of 
which basic rights and benefits asylum seekers deserve should be based on their needs 
rather than on the grounds on which the claims are based, according to this argument. 
This is a valid argument, but as the competent authorities in member states always have to 
presume an application for asylum, this should address the issue.  
 
The directive generally accords freedom of movement to asylum seekers within the 
territory of the host state or within an area assigned to them by that state. This addresses 
more restrictive regulations of some EU member states (Hailbronner 2004: 79). Detention 
will only be allowed in order to check the identity of the applicant for asylum. Refugee 
organisations have rightly criticised the practice of restricting the freedom of movement 
as being contrary to human rights provisions. Yet, as Hailbronner (2004: 80) demonstrates, 
some member states’ practices (for instance Germany) tended to be even more restrictive.  
 
Member States must guarantee several reception conditions: 
 
 Material reception conditions, such as accommodation, food and clothing.  
 Family unity. 
 Medical and psychological care. 
 Access to the education system for minor children and language courses.  
 Lodgings in a house, accommodation centre or hotel.  
 In all cases, applicants must have the possibility of communicating with legal 
 advisers, NGOs and the UNHCR.  
 Access to employment. 
 
The most heavily disputed provision concerns the access to employment - criticised for 
the delay in access to it (Guild 2004). At the same time, member states have been generally 
reluctant to grant access to the labour market in the field of migration. In this directive, 
they are at least obliged to open access to the labour market and vocational training to 
applicants for asylum 12 months after they have lodged their application. Thus, despite 
the criticisms related to its complicated procedure (Guild 2004: 215), and the UNHCR 
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argument that a six months delay would have been preferable, it is already significant that 
throughout 27 EU member states this was possible at all. In addition, as with all reception 
conditions, member states will be free to apply more favourable conditions of reception.  
 
In conclusion, this directive rectified one particular problem within the member states - 
the wide variance of reception conditions. It is clear from the evidence presented that this 
is an advance in those conditions across the EU 27. For most member states, they will need 
to be higher than before the directive. Equally, there is no obligation to lower any 
favourable conditions. Consequently, the directive is beneficial for the European Union. 
 
 
(b) The ‘Asylum Qualification Directive’  
The asylum qualification directive (Council Directive 2004/83/EC) addresses three 
important elements of asylum: (1) the recognition of refugees, (2) the content of refugee 
status, and (3) the approximation of rules. In addition, the directive highlights the grounds 
for qualification for subsidiary protection. 
 
In order to make the distinction between subsidiary protection and refugee status clear, 
the directive provides definitions of both concepts. A refugee is defined exactly as in 
article 1A of the Geneva Convention. On the other hand, a person eligible for subsidiary 
protection is a: 
 
third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as a refugee but in 
respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person 
concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a stateless 
person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of 
suffering serious harm.  
 
As Hailbronner (2004: 58) suggests, both protection as a refugee within the terms of the 
Geneva Convention, and subsidiary protection – for those who fall outside the convention 
- are included in this legislation.  
 
The directive addresses many of the issues in substantive asylum law which have had 
forced divergences in national practices before, and it increases protection. Firstly, the 
established grounds for persecution are the same as in the Geneva Convention, thereby 
solidifying the group of people qualifying for refugee status. In addition to the generally 
accepted forms of persecution, the directive sets out three principles, which have not 
been applied by member states prior to it (Hailbronner 2004: 60). For the first time, 
‘persecution can stem from non-state actors’ where the state is unable or unwilling to 
provide protection. Given the increase in people fleeing on such grounds, this is a 
significant widening of the concept. Secondly, the directive also includes child specific and 
gender specific forms of persecution, not in existence prior to the legislation (Monar 2005: 
132). Finally, persecution may take place even though all persons in a particular country 
face generalised oppression. In essence, the effect of all these legal changes means that 
the directive goes beyond existing refugee rights enshrined in the Geneva Convention. 
 
Balzacq and Carrera (2005: 48-49), however, are concerned as to why refugees and persons 
under subsidiary protection are not treated equally. They demonstrate that some rights 
accorded to persons granted subsidiary protection are below the rights of refugee 
protection. Consequently, they wonder whether this is a ‘double standard consistent with 
the general philosophy of equality of treatment for people in need of and who qualify for 
international protection’. Yet, persons who are granted subsidiary protection do not qualify 
for international protection under the Geneva Convention (Hailbronner 2004: 62). The 
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provisions in this directive represent the first concrete European initiative to protect those 
who fall outside the refugee definition.  
 
In an ideal world, one could conceive of rewriting the Geneva Convention to broaden the 
concept of asylum. However, this has not happened to date, and the alternative to this 
directive is only the member states’ discretion as to how much they want to help. Under 
this directive, there is no discretion anymore, and subsidiary protection rights are codified. 
Consequently, this is a substantial success in expanding rights for people in need of 
protection.  
 
 
(c) The ‘Asylum Procedures Directive’ 
On 9 November 2004, the Council agreed politically on the directive on minimum 
standards for procedures - the Asylum Procedures Directive (Balzacq and Carrera 2005: 50). 
The Commission had first presented its proposal for the directive in September 2000, and 
submitted an amended version by June 2002. After intense negotiations, a ‘general 
approach’ was agreed in April 2004, and politically confirmed in November 2004. The 
directive had not formally been adopted by the end of 2004 due to the lack of agreement 
on a list of ‘safe country of origin’. Yet, on 1 December 2005 it was finally formally adopted, 
leaving the list to the side. 
 
The harmonisation of asylum procedures is of vital importance for a common asylum 
system together with the reception conditions directive. Firstly, it contributes to the 
prevention of secondary movements of asylum seekers. Secondly, it is vital for the asylum 
seekers themselves as they are no longer able to freely choose their country of application 
under the Dublin Regulation. As they cannot chose their country anymore, it is vital to 
harmonise procedures in order maintain fairness towards people in need of protection. 
Thirdly, this legislation will enable follow-up legislations in the area in the longer term 
(Hailbronner 2004: 70). 
 
Monar (2005: 133) describes how both the Treaty of Amsterdam and the Tampere 
programme demanded the adoption of policy instruments within the transitional period 
of five years ending on 30 April 2004. This put considerable pressure on the Council for the 
adoption of the directives in time, which was managed in a meeting on 29-30 April. The 
Asylum Procedures Directive defines minimum standards for procedures, which include: 
 
 access to the asylum process 
 the right to interview 
 access to interpretation and legal assistance 
 detention circumstances 
 the appeals procedure 
 
In addition, it defines controversial concepts, such as: 
  
 ‘First country of asylum’: this allows applications to be rejected where applicants 
 have been recognised as refugees in another country with sufficient protection 
 in that country. 
 ‘Safe country of origin’1: this allows considering a group of applications of 
 nationals of one country to be unfounded, thereby entering into an accelerated 
 procedure.  The  failure  to  agree  on  a  specific list of  countries in  this category has 
      delayed its formal adoption. 
                                                            
1 It is worth noting that the European Parliament has successfully challenged aspects of the safe country of 
origin provisions before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in case C133/06 
   
 EU Asylum Policy and the European Commission   
155 J C E R
 
 
 ‘Safe third country’: this allows the transfer of responsibility for the processing of 
 an asylum application to countries of transit to the EU. 
 
This directive has been more severely criticised by NGOs (ECRE et al. 2004) and academics 
than the other three directives. The main arguments relate to a supposed incompatibility 
with international obligations (ECRE et al. 2004: 51). Costello (2005) criticises the three 
controversial concepts: (1) first country of asylum, (2) safe country of origin, and (3) safe 
third country. In her view, these provisions threaten to undermine many of the other 
laudable features during the Tampere process, in particular the Asylum Qualification 
Directive (Costello 2005: 36). According to Costello, these three provisions will undermine 
access to and the integrity of asylum procedures in the European Union.  
 
Doede Ackers (2005), who negotiated the Asylum Procedures Directive on behalf of the 
Commission, disagrees. He explains the rationale for adopting it and the different stages in 
the negotiations. Firstly, Ackers (2005: 32) disputes that the politically agreed general 
approach breaches international human rights obligations. It is argued that for each of the 
safe third country provisions, certain safeguards should be laid down to ensure that if 
member states properly implement these rules, no breaches of international law occur. 
 
Secondly, as it stands the approach adds value to the soft-law standards already agreed, 
including the procedures according to the UNHCR Handbook (Ackers 2005). On the 
question of appeals procedures, the general approach even introduces the obligation to 
ensure an effective remedy before a court or tribunal, which goes beyond the standards in 
the Handbook. It is vital to note at this point that the Handbook is only soft-law in 
international law, and thus left to the individual interpretation of domestic courts, which 
can vary significantly across the EU.  
 
Finally, Ackers (2005) argues that several member states will have to raise their standards 
to comply with the provisions in the general approach. Thus, a framework which requires 
higher standards than the previous practice of member states can hardly be described as a 
breach of international law – certainly not of customary international law. Fullerton (2005) 
fully agrees with this view. In her article, she analyses the asylum situation in Spain and 
Portugal. Although the Iberian Peninsula is closer to regions of conflict and migratory 
routes than most European Union states, the numbers of asylum seekers registered in 
Spain and Portugal are far lower than in other member states of comparable size and 
economic development (Fullerton 2005: 659). While multiple factors deter refugees from 
seeking asylum in Spain and Portugal, their inadmissibility procedures are the most 
important. Both states employ an inadmissibility procedure which results in the rejection 
of a substantial majority of applicants for asylum prior to any hearing on the merits.  
 
The Asylum Procedures Directive limits the grounds for rejecting a claim as inadmissible, 
whereas the Spanish and Portuguese procedures dismiss asylum applications on far 
broader grounds. Consequently, they will contravene the Procedures Directive. As a 
consequence, an asylum procedures directive that increases the number of asylum seekers 
who will be able to apply for refugee status in a number of member states - such as Spain 
and Portugal - is a clear legal advance for refugee rights.  
 
In conclusion, this section has demonstrated that the CEAS has brought very clear legal 
advances in terms of refugee protection. The CEAS has produced harmonising effects in 
national legislations, and, with agreed common minimum standards, it is likely that this 
will prevent a ‘race to the bottom’ between national legislators. Moreover, the CEAS is also 
of importance for the EU as it opens up the road to the communitarisation of asylum 
policy, which signifies transfer of national sovereignty to the EU level. Thus, the legal 
doctrines of the direct effect of EU law and its supremacy will apply to the area for the first 
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time. Therefore, individual asylum seekers can take states and individuals to the domestic 
courts. In the next two sections, it will be argued that the European Commission played an 
important role in the legal advance. The next section will provide the theoretical 
framework for this analysis, while the subsequent section will provide the empirical 
evidence for this theoretical suggestion. 
 
 
The European Commission as a Supranational Policy Entrepreneur (SPE)? The case of 
the CEAS 
It is important to evaluate the role of agency in this significant process of European 
integration in an area so close to the very essence of the nation state. The debate over 
agency in European integration (and thereby regarding the EAW) falls within the dispute 
between intergovernmentalists (Hoffmann 1966; Moravcsik 1993), supranationalists (Haas 
1958; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997, 1998; Stone Sweet et al. 2001), and institutionalists 
‘somewhere in between’ (Beach 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b; Kaunert 2005, 2007; Pollack 
1997, 2003) concerning the role of supranational institutions in the process of European 
integration.  
 
This article suggests a reconceptualisation of the framework of supranational policy 
entrepreneurs (SPE), which is often referred to by the academic literature that discusses 
the role of agency in European integration (Beach 2005a; Moravcsik 1999a; Pollack 1997, 
2003; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997, 1998; Stone Sweet et al. 2001) when analysing the 
political role of the European Commission. The concept of a political entrepreneur is 
grounded in the works of Kingdon within the context of US politics. Kingdon (1984: 173) 
suggests a policy-making model starting with the identification of a problem (first stream), 
which is then followed by a search for alternative solutions (second stream) and a decision 
among these alternatives (third stream). On some occasions, a ‘policy window’ opens for 
the adoption of certain policies. Policy entrepreneurs, “advocates […] willing to invest their 
resources – time, reputation, money’ (Kingdon 1984: 188), stand at this window in order to 
propose, lobby for and sell a policy proposal. However, this conceptualisation needs to be 
extended by using constructivist insights of norm construction and entrepreneurship 
(Kaunert 2007).  
 
Why is this important? At the political bargaining stage (the politics stream), where 
decisions amongst different alternatives are taken, the EU is dominated by member states 
preferences and interests. In principle, this would indicate the benefits of a liberal 
intergovernmental analysis for the policy area. In this view, European integration can best 
be explained as a series of rational choices made by national leaders and dominated by 
national interests (Moravcsik 1991, 1993, 1998, 1999a, 1999b). But where do member 
states’ national interests and preferences come from? Moravcsik (1998) assumes national 
interests to be exogenous of the EU process. The interests of the member states are stable 
before they come to the bargaining table. However, is it reasonable to assert that 
preferences are exogenous? The EU has created a system whereby member states 
continuously interact at different levels. The claim that this would not change preferences 
over time appears doubtful. Even within the context of the international system with less 
social interaction amongst states, Katzenstein (1996) has demonstrated convincingly how 
norms and values shape national interests. Constructivist literature clearly showed how 
these norms change over time (Finnemore 1996a, 1996b; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).  
 
Yet, if national interests and preferences are shaped by different norms and values, as 
argued in this article, this implies that a fourth stream – the norm stream - is underlying the 
three other streams. Norms consequently influence the definition of political problems, 
the search for policy alternatives, and finally the national preferences in the politics stream 
where decisions are taken.  
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How can norms be constructed and how can they be observed? Firstly, actors provide 
reasons for action. The SPE constantly pushes for his reasons for action to become 
accepted as a norm, albeit in competition with other actors. This is the first stage of norm 
creation in the norm life cycle as described by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), and is 
followed by the norm socialisation stage. Eventually, a norm becomes the dominant norm. 
Consequently, SPEs are important in the social construction and reconstruction of norms 
that steer the political movement of the other streams.  
 
This article will assess the extent to which the European Commission has been able to play 
the role of an SPE with regard to the CEAS. Asylum policy is a very difficult field with 
complex decision-making rules (Noll, 2000). Article 63 TEC sets out a framework agenda for 
the transitional period of five years; it requires the Council to adopt a variety of measures 
within 5 years. However, it is striking that the majority of measures contain the mandate of 
minimum standards. Article 63 TEC asks the Council to adopt the following four measures 
‘within a period of five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam’: 
 
1. ‘criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member State is responsible for 
considering an application for asylum submitted by a national of a third country in 
one of the Member States; 
2. minimum standards on the reception of asylum seekers in Member States; 
3. minimum standards with respect to the qualification of nationals of third countries 
as refugees; 
4. minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting or withdrawing 
refugee status;’ 
 
However, according to article 67 TEC, “during a transitional period of five years following 
the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Council shall act unanimously on a 
proposal from the Commission or on the initiative of a Member State and after consulting 
the European Parliament”. It is only after this period of five years that the Commission 
gains its usual sole right of initiative. While this article is often seen as a ‘break’ on the 
Commission in order to curb its legislative powers, in practice, as the subsequent section 
shows, this has not had this effect necessarily. In fact, it encouraged the Commission to 
have the most competitive proposals, which in the area of the CEAS meant that no 
member state actually thought it was able to present better proposals than the 
Commission.2  
 
The legal instruments available to the EU pre-Tampere used to be very weak with little 
legal effect - mainly conventions, which had to be ratified by each member state 
individually. These were replaced with new instruments (directives) in 1999. Nonetheless, 
during the Tampere programme from 1999 to 2004, the decision-making procedure was 
based on the so-called ‘consultation procedure’. This meant that the European Parliament 
only had to be consulted, but was left with no decision-making power. The sole legal 
decision-maker was the Council of Ministers, which had to vote by unanimity. Very clearly, 
this meant that every proposal by the Commission has to be negotiated upon, and often 
this involved significant changes (Batjes 2006; Lambert 2004), which could appear to limit 
the argument that the Commission would play a significant role in the CEAS.  
 
Yet, the next section argues that despite this institutionally weak(er) position by the 
Commission, compared to the first pillar, it managed to significantly influence the policy 
shape of the CEAS. Institutionally, it possesses the key role as political ‘monitor’ and legal 
‘enforcer’ of the law in the asylum area. The Commission has the legal power to investigate 
                                                            
2 This information came from a range of 26 interviews carried out with individuals from the various Permanent 
Representations of the Member States and the Missions to the EU of Candidate Countries, carried between 1 
April 2004 and 1 August 2004, 
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claims that member states are failing in their EC law obligations and to bring them before 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for such alleged failures. While this formal instrument 
also remained largely untouched, the Commission nevertheless managed to shape the 
policy direction through a series of soft law measures over a prolonged period and 
through consensus-building by developing and funding pro-migrant organizations. 
 
Kaunert (2005, 2007) conceptualises the ways in which political entrepreneurs can achieve 
this in the following:  
 
1. First mover advantage: SPEs need to come in faster with their proposals than their 
rivals. 
2. Persuasion strategy: As suggested above, in order to achieve acceptance, other 
actors need to be convinced by the reasons for the action suggested. 
3. Alliances: It is vital for the SPE to form initial alliances with other powerful actors to 
create a bandwagon effect, whereby more actors will join the ‘winning team’.  
 
 
Evaluating the normative construction of the Common European Asylum System by 
Commission: To what extent was it an SPE? 
The following section will analyse the normative construction of the Common European 
Asylum System. In the preceding two sections, it has become clearer that the CEAS is an 
area of ‘normative construction’. How has the analysis of this normative construction of 
the EU asylum policy been operationalised? Firstly, norms are defined as: “written and non-
written rules which are reasons for action of different orders. They enable, restrain, or 
constitute different actions by providing a standard of appropriate behaviour for a 
particular reference group” (Kaunert 2005: 462). Secondly, it is essential to examine the 
complimentary underlying normative question of the rule around which the political 
‘grand debates’ are structured, i.e. the official and unofficial political discourses between 
actors in the policy-making environment.  
 
How far can one attribute changes in the norm stream, if any, to the supranational policy 
entrepreneurship of the European Commission? This section will demonstrate how the 
European Commission has acted to initiate and push this process of normative change, 
which is part of its role as a supranational policy entrepreneur, and enables a political 
adoption process. It constructs the political environment in which a policy is adopted – 
and thereby sets the agenda (Kaunert 2007), which means it also fulfils its legal role as the 
‘engine’ or ‘motor’ of European integration. 
 
 
The Commission as a strategic first mover: EU asylum becomes connected with the Internal 
Market and international humanitarian norms 
The Commission’s strategy was two-fold: firstly, ‘a persuasion strategy’ as a ‘first mover’ in 
order to get the foot in the door. It socially constructed the functional link between a 
‘moving policy train’ – the single market – and EU action in asylum matters. It pushed for 
this starting in the 1970s, throughout the late 80s and early 90s. It published 
communications that became the reference points for later legislation in the CEAS. 
Secondly, the Commission also constructed EU asylum action into the international 
prevailing norms on refugee protection - the Geneva Convention - which gave it more 
legitimacy as an actor. Norms only develop gradually, and therefore the Commission 
would have to act pragmatically in the meantime. The following section will demonstrate 
both of these aspects. 
 
The first serious attempt to shape the EU asylum agenda was the Commission’s famous 
‘White Paper’ (COM (84) 310 final) on the completion of the Internal Market in 1984 
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(Geddes 2000: 70; Mitsilegas et al. 2003: 28; Mitsilegas 2009). It is significant for this 
research as it represents the origins of the Commission’s attempts to gain competences 
for the EU in asylum policy. The document proposed the abolition of all internal border 
controls, but also provided a link between the former and economic growth, as well as a 
whole range of compensatory measures – such as immigration, asylum, external border 
controls, and policies on visas and drugs, and crime. Yet, none of the asylum proposals 
made succeeded due to the gradual nature in which norms often develop (Geddes 2000: 
71; 2001: 24). Yet, member states accepted the link between the internal market and the 
EU asylum policy – and in time the success of the single market would drag along the EU 
asylum policy - as long as the European Commission kept pushing.  
 
In 1991, the Commission took the next steps in its persuasion strategy - constructing the 
link to both the single market and international refugee norms. The communication from 
the Commission (SEC (91) 1857 final) acknowledged the fact that the political and social 
importance of the right of asylum had increased in Western Europe (see Commission of 
the EC 1991). It was claimed that, as a consequence, individual states were less able to deal 
with the problem caused by the increased influx of asylum seekers. However, the 
Commission insisted that humanitarian standards would need to be maintained, and took 
the 1951 Geneva Convention as a starting point. The communication also underlined the 
humanitarian objectives of the Convention.  
 
The following common actions were envisaged in the short term in order to cope with the 
increase in asylum seekers (Commission of the EC 1991): 
 
 speeding up administrative and judicial decision procedures 
 harmonisation of the conditions under which people can be turned down at the 
 external borders 
 effective return policy of the rejected asylum applicants 
 exchange information procedure 
 
The following actions were envisaged with regards to the harmonisation of asylum law in 
the internal market (Commission of the EC 1991): 
 
 harmonising the national criteria and practices regarding the determination of 
 refugee status 
 harmonising the rules with regards to the stay of “de facto” refugees (those who 
 do not qualify for Convention refugee status) 
 harmonisation of the reception conditions for asylum seekers 
 
These suggestions are already exceptionally close to the objectives of the Tampere 
programme of 1999. The communication in 1991 even includes its outcomes in 2004 - the 
directives on asylum qualification, asylum procedures and reception conditions. The 
suggestions by the Commission had no clear legal basis in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 
and certainly not before Maastricht in 1991, and were extremely ambitious. While not 
being pursued in policy terms, they clearly did affect the norm environment of decision-
makers. The issues never slipped off the agenda from the day of this communication – 
which the Commission ensured with future communications. 
 
The communication in 1994 (COM (94) 23 final) represented another important step in the 
persuasion strategy (see Commission of the EC 1994). With a view to stimulate discussion 
and debate, it followed on from the earlier document of 1991 (also referred to in COM (94) 
23 final: 23-27). It built on the suggestions made in 1991. The communication called for the 
following measures: 
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 a harmonised application of the definition of a refugee in accordance with article 
 1 a of the Geneva Convention 
 the development of minimum standards for fair and efficient asylum procedures 
 the elaboration of a convention on manifestly unfounded asylum applications 
 the harmonisation of policies concerning those who can be admitted as 
 refugees, but may be in need of help 
 a measure harmonising schemes of temporary protection 
 a European fund for refugees 
 
These measures all represent the basic foundation of what became the Tampere 
programme in 1999, and, finally, the outcomes of it in 2004 - the directives on temporary 
protection, asylum qualification, asylum procedures, and reception conditions, and even 
other adopted instruments, such as the European Fund for Refugees. Indeed, all of the 
aforementioned communications display the determination of the Commission to drive 
forward the process of EU integration in EU asylum matters. Yet, an efficient EU asylum 
policy would only be possible with a major treaty change (Gradin 1999). Therefore, it was 
implicit in the strategy of the Commission that it could compromise as long as the goal of 
full communitarisation was reached.  
 
 
Connecting the asylum policy to International Human Rights norms in the face of the ‘war on 
terror’ 
In the previous section, it was demonstrated how the European Commission managed to 
connect the EU asylum policy to the single market. Acceptance of this fact led to 
increasing dynamics in the area. Yet, it was equally important for the Commission to link 
asylum policy to the Geneva Convention. This was particularly important after 9/11 - the 
terrorist attacks on New York and Washington.3 The following section will demonstrate the 
strategy used in this endeavour - divided into two parts: (1) the anchoring of EU asylum 
policy before Tampere 1999 by relying on civil society and NGOs, and (2) the continued 
insistence on international human rights standards after 9/11, despite shifts in rhetoric to 
accommodate the ‘war on terror’. This is in contrast to the area of criminal justice, where 
the ‘war on terror’ was pushed strongly as a reason for action (Kaunert 2007). 
 
Firstly, when the Commission started to construct a role for the EU into national asylum 
policy, it had decided to link it to both the single market - to push the project - and the 
internationally prevailing refugee protection norms - to gain legitimacy. The latter is 
particularly important as the Commission has been frequently attacked for not being 
democratic since the 1990s. The essence of its legitimacy problem is that the ‘unelected’ 
Commission is widely perceived as detached from the concerns of EU citizens. Thus, its 
own legitimacy needed to be increased through the legitimacy of other actors in the field - 
the UNHCR, NGOs, and the European Parliament. The literature has established that the 
Commission often aims to use NGOs to improve its own legitimacy (Greenwood 2003). 
Both Hix (1999) and Geddes (2000) have pointed out their importance for the Commission, 
particularly in the areas of asylum and migration.  
 
Yet, European integration always remains the most important objective above all for the 
Commission. Geddes (2000: 134) suggests the success of this strategy. While NGOs criticise 
current EU policy, the answer to the problem tends to be more, not less, ‘Europe’. This was 
                                                            
3 Nonetheless, it needs to be acknowledged that there has been a tension between refugee rights and 
terrorism since the beginning of JHA intergovernmental cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s. It could even be 
argued to have been a key driver of cooperation which preceded even the single market and was edging the 
European Community into a policy sphere designed to track 'others' - primarily refugees and asylum seekers 
under the Dublin programme (see Lodge 2004, 2007).  
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confirmed throughout interviews.4 There was widespread support for a 
communitarisation of asylum matters in particular. As described by Geddes, the mood of 
NGOs was one of frustration because of the lack of what they perceived to be progress in 
the asylum policy. At the same time, they did not attribute the blame on the European 
Commission, which was perceived as an ally. The blame was usually attributed to the 
Council of Ministers and member states.  
                                                           
 
Some NGOs were under no illusion of their own ability to influence the Commission, 
asserting that they were mostly utilised by the Commission when it was useful to do so5 – 
to gain information and legitimacy. Despite this realisation, they represented an important 
ally for the Commission, being useful on two fronts (Geddes 2000: 136): (1) they push for 
asylum solutions based on the Geneva Convention, and (2) they implicitly support 
European integration by operating at the EU level, thus making the political issues de facto 
‘problems of Europe’.  
 
It is important to note at this point that the Commission partially created this useful ally 
(Geddes 2000: 143). A significant number of NGOs indicated that the Commission was 
actively involved in the creation of their EU structures or their organisation in general, and 
continues to finance the majority of them.6 These findings also confirm Geddes’ 
suggestion of some ‘top-down’ influence of the Commission on pro-migrant groups 
(Geddes 2000: 143).  
 
Secondly, the anchoring of the EU asylum policy within the international prevailing 
refugee rights norms became vital after 11 September 2001. At this point, norms could 
have easily shifted towards a securitisation of asylum - the construction of asylum as a 
security threat. Yet, from the documentary and interview evidence presented below, it is 
clear that the Commission took the political decision at that time to not link the asylum 
issue to the ‘war on terror’.7  
 
Van Selm (2003: 143) describes it as remarkable that the Commission’s proposal for a 
Framework Decision on combating terrorism made no mention of refugees, asylum, or the 
exclusion of any person seeking refugee status. In her view, this was particularly 
remarkable as the Geneva Convention did provide grounds for exclusion from refugee 
status for terrorists. Yet, the Commission decided not to link the issues of asylum and 
terrorism.  
 
Nonetheless, in agreement with the NGOs’ views8, the war on terror did influence the 
policy area (Boswell 2007, 2008). The conclusion of the 20 September 2001 meeting 
reflected mainly judicial and criminal co-operation, but also asylum matters (Van Selm 
2003: 145). The conclusions, amongst others, invited the Commission to examine the 
relationship between safeguarding internal security and complying with international 
protection obligations and instruments. This is of particular importance. It appears as an 
attempt by member states to put internal security above international protection norms, 
and thus effectively to securitize asylum.  
 
 
4 This information came from a range of 11 interviews carried out with individuals from various Non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), carried between 1 April 2004 and 1 August 2004, 
5 This information came from interview (number 2) of a range of 11 interviews carried out with individuals from 
various NGOs, carried between 1 April 2004 and 1 August 2004, 
6 See note 4. 
7 This information came from two interviews (numbered 10 and 16) carried out with 25 individuals from the 
European Commission, carried between 1 April 2004 and 1 August 2004, 
8 See note 4. 
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Yet, in the end the Commission managed to keep the policy anchored within international 
norms, and thereby prevented a shift into security (see Commission of the EC 2001). 
Consequently, in the working document entitled, The relationship between safeguarding 
internal security and complying with international protection obligations (Commission of the 
EC 2001), the Commission did not advocate any change in international refugee 
protection, and bases the Geneva Convention at the heart of any response. This was 
written in response to the Council conclusion mentioned above.  
 
There are two main premises of the Commission working document: (1) bona fide 
refugees and asylum seekers should not become victims of the recent events, and (2) no 
avenues should exist for the supporting of terrorist acts. The document made it clear that a 
scrupulous application of the exceptions to refugee protection available under the current 
laws is the appropriate response. It was therefore an outright rejection of placing security 
in contradiction to existing refugee protection instruments. This was confirmed in an 
interview with the author of this document.9 Moreover, while the Commission 
acknowledged that terrorists might use asylum channels, it considered this as not likely, as 
other channels would be more discreet and more suitable for criminal practices.  
 
It was suggested for the member states to use existing legal instruments (Commission of 
the EC 2001) - based on the Geneva Convention – such as: 
 
 Article 1 (f), the exclusion clause, should be used within the asylum procedure in 
 order to avoid refoulement 
 if sufficient grounds are known for exclusion, an accelerated procedure should 
 start 
 
There were suggestions for the following policy alterations (Commission of the EC 2001): 
 
 the creation of EU level guidelines on the use of exclusion clauses 
 the proposal on minimum standards for asylum procedures should include 
 provisions for the cancellation of status on the grounds of information coming 
 to light after processing of claims 
 
In essence, this document followed up on the somewhat harsher language of the 20 
September 2001 conclusions of the European Council. Yet, contrary to the initial demand 
which seemed to indicate an attempt to present asylum as a security threat in the war on 
terror, the working document did not deviate from accepted international norms. In fact, it 
demonstrated the legal value of the Geneva Convention, and thereby strengthened it. It 
resisted the temptation to move an issue into the security area when it was perceived as a 
human rights issue. In fact, the Commission rescued this political perception by trying to 
reconcile the demands for greater security with the international refugee protection 
norms.  
 
It would have been difficult for the Commission to do otherwise, as it had consistently 
anchored the EU asylum policy in international refugee norms. Consequently, it could 
have been perceived as inconsistent and thus less credible. It would have lost legitimacy in 
the eyes of the NGOs, who have been supporting the Commission in its efforts to create an 
EU asylum policy. Any deviation from this established position would have damaged the 
Commission politically. Yet, the demands by member states seemed to go into that 
direction - attempting to place security above refugee protection. In the end, the 
Commission managed to please both by presenting harsher rhetoric using the language 
                                                            
9 This information came from interview (number 16) of a range of 25 interviews carried out with individuals 
from the European Commission, carried between 1 April 2004 and 1 August 2004, 
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of security, while maintaining the Geneva Convention as the bedrock of the EU asylum 
policy. 
 
 
Conclusion: Which way should the EU go? – Communitarising the EU asylum policy as 
the main strategic goal 
Table 1 (below) provides a map for the development of norms in the area of asylum during 
the Tampere programme, summarising the main developments of the two previous 
sections. Initially, EU co-operation on asylum before the Tampere programme had been 
mainly in quadrant II of the matrix. It was characterised by an anchoring in the 
internationally prevailing norm on national sovereignty and the refugee protection norm - 
the Geneva Convention. At this point, there were three different possibilities for norms to 
develop if there was any change at all. 
 
 
Table 1: The EU at a normative crossroads –developments in the EU asylum policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
National 
sovereignty
EU pooling of
sovereignty
Security threat Refugee Protection
I
III
II
IV
Q1Q2
Q3
Q0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Firstly, the policy could develop from Q(0) to Q(3). This change would imply that national 
sovereignty would remain the bedrock of asylum polices in Europe, and thus there would 
be no movement on the axis of whether the EU should be legislating in the area of asylum. 
In fact, this would imply that no EU legislation would be possible, or indeed the legislation 
efforts would be meaningless.  
 
The second alternative would have been a development from Q(0) to Q(2). This change 
would imply that a Supranational Policy Entrepreneur had managed to persuade the 
European member states to pool national sovereignty in the area. However, the 
implications of 11 September 2001 would have been used in such a way as to construct 
asylum as a security threat in order to achieve this goal. In some sense, this is the most 
likely scenario, as it is similar to the area of counter-terrorism where European integration 
was pushed forward in the wake of the terrorist attacks on New York (Kaunert 2007). 
 
Nonetheless, it is the third alternative that the Commission managed to achieve, which 
involved movement from Q(0) to Q(1). This implies that the Commission managed to 
persuade member states of the pooling of national sovereignty at the EU level. At the 
164  
Kaunert 
J C E R 
 
 
same time, this pooling is firmly anchored in international refugee protection norms – 
especially the Geneva Convention.  
 
Norms changed very significantly during the Tampere programme - and the Commission 
was clearly significant, as the aforementioned evidence suggests. It played the role of a 
strategic first mover in order to shape the debate in a way that placed the EU at the centre 
of the policy. Yet, in the area of asylum, these norms developed incrementally. In fact, the 
Commission had started to push in the 1980s, and managed to construct the area 
normatively to the single market. At the same time, the Commission had anchored it in the 
internationally prevailing norm of refugee protection - the Geneva Convention. Yet, the 
norm of national sovereignty still remained very sticky and difficult to change.  
 
In fact, this had changed by the end of the Tampere programme, and the first phase of the 
EU asylum policy has been established. It was a significant success and the main goal of 
the Commission - the full communitarisation - had been achieved. Nonetheless, contrary 
to expectations, this had not been achieved by going from Q(0) to Q(2), but rather to Q(1). 
In fact, the Commission had never attempted to construct an EU asylum policy based on 
the perception that it was a security threat. Even after 11 September 2001, it pushed for 
the fulfilment of international obligations under the Geneva Convention.  
 
Even under difficult circumstances, such as September 11, it pushed to include refugee 
rights under the Geneva Convention, and opposed the perception of asylum seekers as a 
security threat. In the end, this strategy paid political dividends. In fact, all four asylum 
directives actually increased the legal value of the Geneva Convention. This also implied 
the fact that the EU asylum policy had been cemented in this norm more strongly than it 
had before. As explained, the legal value of EU law is much harder than international law, 
which means that it has actually given the Geneva Convention ‘extra teeth’. At the same 
time, the Commission managed to maintain, in principle, the support of the UNHCR, the 
NGOs and the European Parliament, and thus maintained its own legitimacy in the 
process. This makes its success all the more remarkable. 
 
This confirms the suggestion by Boswell (2007), that asylum policy was not securitized at 
the EU level after 9/11. This does not mean that it is not restrictive in some dimensions; yet, 
it is progressive in other dimensions, notably in its increase in legal value of the Geneva 
Convention. As suggested at the beginning of the article, it seems counter-intuitive that 
the EU would ‘securitize’ the EU Asylum Policy, and goes against several academic 
arguments that were often made about asylum cooperation in Europe (Boswell 2003a, 
2003b, 2007, 2008; Ellermann 2008; Freeman 1998; Geddes 2000, 2001; Guiraudon 2000, 
2001, 2003; Joppke 1998, 2001; Lavenex 1998, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2006; Occhipinti 
2003; Stetter 2000, 2007; Thielemann 2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2005, 2006; Thielemann and 
Dewan 2006). If national policy-makers are perfectly able to circumvent national pressures 
in order to restrict immigration and asylum at the EU level, why should they securitize the 
issues in order to achieve what they are already achieving? And why would European 
institutions join in this process, in which they stand to lose credibility and legitimacy in the 
eyes of their allies, the NGOs and the UNHCR? The answer is such that they are not taking 
part in this process; in fact the European Commission has done its utmost in the first phase 
of the CEAS to prevent such developments. Yet, without a doubt, this does not mean that 
member states may not try again in the future, especially in times of recession and 
depression. We will need to see to evaluate any further development of EU asylum policy 
with the future ‘Stockholm Programme’, which will succeed to the Hague programme after 
2009/10. 
 
 
*** 
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